A priority task for homeland security is the coverage of large spans of open border that cannot be continuously physically monitored for intrusion. Low-cost monitoring solutions based on wireless sensor networks have been identified as an effective means to perform perimeter monitoring. An adhoc wireless sensor network scattered near a border could be used to perform surveillance over a large area with relatively little human intervention. Determining the effectiveness of such an autonomous network in detecting and thwarting an intelligent intruder is a difficult task. We propose a model for an intelligent attacker that attempts to find a detectionfree path in a region with sparse sensing coverage. In particular, we apply reinforcement learning (RL) -a machine learning approach -for our model. RL algorithms are well suited for scenarios in which specifying and finding an optimal solution is difficult. By using RL, our attacker can easily adapt to new scenarios by translating constraints into rewards. We compare our RL-based technique to a reasonable heuristic in simulation. Our results suggest that our RL-based attacker model is significantly more effective, and therefore more realistic, than the heuristic approach.
INTRODUCTION
Sensors are inexpensive, low-power devices that are capable of limited local processing, wireless communications, and sensing of their physical environments. A wireless sensor network is a large collection of sensor nodes that coordinate to perform some specific action [3] . For example, a dense concentration of sensors forming an ad-hoc network could be used in identifying and tracking movement. Such networks could be used to perform unmanned surveillance and detect (physical) intruders along border regions and around facilities such as nuclear power plants, chemical plants, and military bases [9] .
Wireless sensor networks are an increasingly attractive means to bridge the gap between the physical and virtual world [2] . Attack models on sensor networks include attacks on both the physical aspects such as device tampering, jamming -as well as logical aspects such as sybil attacks, attacks on the routing protocols and selective message forwarding [10] .
Two parameters are relevant to autonomous intruder detection: (a)connectivity -the sensor network needs to be connected to enable transmission of data to base stations; and (b)coverage -each location in the physical space of interest must be within the sensing range of at least one active sensor [22, 14] . These parameters are used to determine the topology and density of the distribution and are being actively investigated [4, 13, 9] Maintaining complete connectivity and full coverage is a special case of this problem and Tannenbaum et. al. discuss the issues in achieving sufficient coverage for a large area such as a border [18, 8] . Node faults and irregularity in sensing range further affect the coverage. These issues indicate that gaps may exist in the coverage areas even if the distribution was calculated to be optimal. The presence of these gaps is further emphasized when sensing coverage is less than 100%. As a consequence, paths may exist that could enable an intruder to evade detection while traversing the perimeter.
Eavesdropping can further aid the intruder in finding unmonitored areas. Since sensor devices use wireless signals, they are particularly vulnerable to eavesdropping [1] . This can taken advantage of by an intruder to estimate the positions of sensors in a monitored region. Essentially, the intruder enters the region and eavesdrops on the local transmission of wireless signals in response to the intrusion. The messages may be encrypted, but the intruder can infer that the sending node is probably reporting a sensor reading that indicates his presence. By estimating the location of the sensor, he can map out its location. Signal strength measure-ments could be used to enhance the precision of the estimate. We use the term probing to denote this action of identifying a sensor node by inducing it to send wireless signals. By repeated probing, an attacker can map the perimeter with sufficient detail to find regions that are not monitored, including complete paths crossing the region without detection. Finding such a path would create a critical breach of the security perimeter.
The most obvious defense against this form of attack would be to increase the sensor density until the chance of finding such a path becomes very small. However, increasing the density sufficiently could require a major increase in the number of sensors and a correspondingly large increase in the cost of the system. We look at alternative defenses that are effective without the costs of additional hardware.
In order to study our proposed defenses, we need to model the behavior of an attacker. Based on the behavior of the attacker outlined above, we propose an attacker model that uses a combination of probing and path finding algorithms to identify detection free paths in the perimeter. To imitate the behavior of the attacker, the model should be flexible, since a true attacker would be adaptive. The model should be capable of finding paths without exposing the attacker to large risks of getting caught. Contributions: In this paper, we make the following contributions:
• We suggest a timing-correlation-based attack for physical intrusion in a region monitored by wireless sensor networks, which allows the intruder to identify detection-free paths.
• We suggest a heuristic model for the attacker, and based on our model suggest a defense against timing correlation attacks ( §2).
• We introduce an intruder model based on reinforcement learning. ( §3).
• We contrast the performance of the RL-based agent against the heurisitc model. ( §4).
In particular, we believe that use of reinforcement learning as a means of modeling the behavior of an attacker has received limited attention to date. Our work provides insight into its application in a specific domain. Addtionally, we believe that the proposed model can be useful for further exploration of defenses against the the attacker described above.
A RULE-BASED ATTACKER MODEL
In this section, we briefly describe the model of the world that we use in our study and then describe our heuristic intruder model.
Modeling the world
The simulation world represents a large region that is to be monitored for intrusion. For simplicity, we assume that the world is a rectangular grid with sensors located at integer positions (i, j). The premise of our attack model is based on less-than-optimal placement of sensors -such a placement could occur, for example, with an air-dropped deployment of sensors over a large region. Thus, the sensors in our model are randomly distributed across this world; each sensor may be located in any one of the blocks of the grid world.
The number of sensor nodes in the world is specified by the coverage, which is expressed in terms of the percentage of total area of the grid world that is under coverage. The sensing radius is specified in terms of manhattan units and we set the radius to one. The world-grid can be perceived as a graph where each block is a node in the graph with edges in four directions: up, down, left, and right.
Modeling the attacker
The attacker is a location-aware intruder attempting to find a detection-free path across the region. We define one long edge of the rectangular world (the bottom) as the border and the opposite long edge (the top) as the exit. So more precisely, the attacker's goal is to find a detection-free path between the border and the exit. The attacker travels at unit speed, one block per unit time. An attacker using a regular path-finding algorithm would get detected and caught. To find a path, the attacker would have to identify the location of the sensors, which in turn means triggering them. In the event that the attacker realizes that he has been detected, the safest option would be to retreat back to the edge of the perimeter. This retreat action is an indicator of passage of time and allows the attacker to incrementally discover a path. During each iteration, the attacker utilizes any information that was gathered during previous iterations to make decisions.
The attacker applies a depth-first traversal to identify paths. Blocks that are under sensor-surveillance are marked as monitored. Blocks that transit to monitored blocks or other dead end blocks are guaranteed to not have a sensorfree path to the far edge and are marked as dead ends. Once the attacker probes and identifies that it has been detected, it begins to retreat. Prior to retreating we allow the attacker to explore the neighborhood of the location at which it was detected. This allows the attacker to identify alternate paths (or dead ends) to traverse once it returns to this point. The amount of time that the attacker explores the environment is determined by a restraint index κ = f (d, g(t)), where where d is the distance from the far end (exit) of the border and g(t) is a function of the amount of time since detection. Time is measured in terms of the number of actions performed by the attacker and each movement to a neighboring block takes unit time. As a result g(t) is measured in terms of the number of steps taken by the attacker since detection.
Simulation Results
Our simulations were executed on a world of size 200 x 200 with sensing coverage between 0 − 70%. The initial position of the attacker is randomly chosen along any point on one edge of the perimeter. We define detection rate as the number of actions that results in detection versus the total number of actions that the attacker performs. . At lower concentrations, a higher restraint index performs well, detecting paths quicker at equivalent detection rates. Lower restraint indices perform better at higher node concentrations. Thus, an algorithm that could adapt to the node concentrations should perform much better.
Delayed Trigger
To construct a scenario more fully aligned with real costs to the attacker, rather than arbitrary values, we add a sentry to the model. The sentry represents a border guard with the capability to capture the attacker and thereby cost the attacker substantially in time and resources. Next, the algorithm works under the premise that a probe results in a definitive response that a specific block is under sensor surveillance. Cover traffic is one mechanism that could be used to make this a difficult task. In this defense mechanism, each sensor node generates additional encrypted traffic (also known as dummy messages) that are ignored by the receiving nodes. The presence of dummy messages makes it difficult to identify regular notification messages.
1 It is unclear, particularly in the border scenario, that this represents an end to the attacker's activity. Captures may not lead to further detention, and an attacker can hire multiple people to carry out the task without assuming much personal risk.
However, generating cover traffic is a drain on the network's limited power and computational resources. More significantly, there is remains a strong correlation between the sensor's detection event and the corresponding message that is sent to the base station. This could be exploited by a determined attacker to mount a correlation attack by creating events that would cause the sensor to transmit detection messages.
An alternative, which we explore in this study, is to reduce the correlation between the two events. Let t be the time since detection at which the sensor begins to transmit the detection message. By making t non-deterministic, the fundamental assumption that the attacker makes about the environment is invalidated. For our experiments, we set t according to an exponential distribution t = λe −λx . The mean delay is determined by the rate parameter as 1 λ . Figure 3 shows the results of varying the rate parameter on the average number of captures (times the intruder is caught by the sentry) resulting from detection. The addition of random delay to the sensor nodes significantly increases the probability of getting captured and consecutively makes the heuristic approach insufficient. The value of λ needs to be carefully chosen -larger values result in large mean delays in notifying the base station of the intrusion, which affords the attacker longer durations in which to escape. Smaller λ values, however, result in small mean delays that essentially degenerate to deterministic delays from the attacker's perspective. For our simulations, we selected the rate parameter to be 0.5. Dousse et.al. study the tracking of moving intruders in presence of time delays introduced in routing messages from source (sensors) to the sinks [7] and suggest an upper bound on the distance traveled by an attacker. The additional delay introduced by the sensors could be accounted for when tracking the position of the intruder.
In the absence of a reliable way to detect the presence of sensors, an intruder might evolve to take into consideration factors such as sensor coverage and observed response times of the sentry to sensor detections. It is difficult to express these factors as parameters to a simple path-finding algorithm. In ( §3) we investigate the effectiveness of a learning algorithm as a means to model the attacker. 
A RL-BASED APPROACH
An important branch in artificial intelligence is the field of machine learning. Machine learning typically refers to algorithms that cause change in systems that result in either enhancements or synthesis of new systems based on acquisition and integration of knowledge [15] . Machine learning algorithms begin with a hypothesized function h, that maps the input domain I to an output domain O that approximates the output of an idealized function f [12, 16] In supervised learning, the function f is known for the samples set in the training set It. The algorithms are designed on the basis that a function h that approximates the output for It should perform well for a larger unknown input set I. In unsupervised learning, a training set may exist, but no well-defined function f exists. In this work, we focus on class of unsupervised learning algorithms called reinforcement learning.
In reinforcement learning (RL), an agent interacts with an unknown environment and attempts to choose actions that maximize its cumulative payoff [17, 20] . The agent receives sensory input from the environment and performs an action based on this input. The results of the action changes the environment in some manner, which is returned as a scalar reward value (reinforcement) to the agent. A basic RL model consists of:-
• s: the set of environment states
• a: the set of agent actions
• r: the reinforcement received for performing an action.
The attacker has some outcomes that can be mapped as rewards and punishments, and for a given world it is difficult to define a pre-assigned set of inputs and correct outputs. The objective of the attacker is to learn a good policy that balances exploration with exploitation. Having such an attacker allows us to design systems that are robust to more intelligent and flexible adversaries, rather than one that is optimal against a particular set of parameters. This makes reinforcement learning a suitable choice for modeling our attacker.
Q-Learning is one such reinforcement learning technique [19] . At every state, the agent choses from one of the actions at at a state st and receives a reward rt for it. The result of the action at causes the agent to transition to the next state st+1. The goal of the agent is to maximize the total expected reward. The agent's policy π determines the agent's actions. An optimal policy π * is a policy that maximizes the rewards for the agent at every action.
Q-Learning works by approximating Q * , the optimal policy for π, denoted byQ * , and adjusting the values based on the rewards. The value of a state, V π (s), is the sum of the expected reinforcements received when starting from that state and following the agent policy π. By choosing an action a * at which the gain is maximum, the optimal policy can be formed as π * (x) = a [19] .
where α is the learning rate and γ is the discount factor [17] . At any state, the agent can choose to either exploit, i.e. choose an action based on previous experience, or to explore. To guarantee that the results of Q-Learning converge, the agent must select each state-action pair an infinite number of times. The probability p of selecting any action must therefore be non-zero. Random exploration works well for smaller state spaces, but it introduces unnecessary noise for larger state spaces. Boltzmann exploration interweaves the actions of explore and exploit by selecting an action a with the probability px(a) = e Q(x,a) T P at∈A e Q(x,a t ) T
The RL Model
We now describe how we apply RL to our problem space. The agent's view of the world is identical to the model discussed in Section 2. The world is modeled as grid of blocks of unit size. Associated with each block is confidence value σ, −100 ≤ σ ≤ 100 that indicates the agent's confidence that a given block is not under surveillance. Figure 2 .4 is a visualization of how the confidence levels might appear after the agent has sufficiently explored the world. Low-lying contours indicate areas that are certainly under sensor surveillance, flat line regions are unexplored areas, and high-lying regions indicate areas that the agent has sufficiently explored and is confident of being free from sensor coverage.
An episode consists of the agent starting at a location on the border and terminates when the agent retreats, finds Figure 7 : Performance of the learning algorithm a path to the exit, or is captured. We make the assumption that, for a given sensor coverage, the path taken by the agent to arrive at that block and the confidence of the block in which it is currently located are sufficient to determine the agent's next action. Episode confidence is defined as the average confidence of all blocks in the path visited by the agent in that episode. Pairs of discretized block confidence and the average discretized episode confidence form the agent's Q-state value. One additional Q-state is available that is representative of the goal state and is available when the agent reaches the border. The rewards the agent receives are:
• The difference in confidence levels of the two blocks for all actions that do not result in detection or getting captured. An additional positive reward of 10 is given if the action is move-up.
• A positive reward of 500 for reaching the goal state.
• A negative reward of −10 for the retreat action.
• A negative reward of −20 for triggering a sensor. 
Confidence assignments
Each time a block is visited, the agent increments the confidence amount by 10. When an agent identifies a sensor at a block, the confidence of the block is reduced to the minimum block confidence −100. A block that is not under surveillance is more likely to be surrounded by blocks that are also not under sensor surveillance. The converse is also true. To account for this, we cause confidence assignments to ripple. When we assign a confidence c to a block, the immediate four neighbours of the block are assignment confidences of . The rippling behavior may sometimes cause blocks to be incorrectly labeled based on the position and the path that the agent took to arrive at that point. To correct this, we smooth sharp gradients at the end of each run. Our approach in this respect is similar to an image segmentation problem [11] .
Intuitively, a block can be labeled as low confidence if a majority of its neighboring blocks are also low confidence blocks. The reverse also holds true. Unexplored blocks are not considered for this evaluation. For each block k = (i, j), let h k and l k be the likelihoods that a block belongs to the high confidence set and low confidence set respectively. We associate a cost p for each block that has a neighbor that belongs to the opposite set.
The problem can be reduced to partitioning blocks into sets L and H such that
For all blocks in which the reclassification suggests a value different from the actual assignment, the confidence levels are reinitialized to 0.
SIMULATION RESULTS
We use two measures to gauge the performance of the RLbased algorithm: capture ratio and time to find a path. For comparison, we consider the naive algorithm working in an environment without sensor delay as an oracle model. Note that without sensor delay, the "naive oracle" model knows immediately when it gets detected by a sensor. All executions were performed using agents that were well-trained over a perimeter of similar node coverage. Values of α and γ for the Q-learning algorithm were chosen to be 0.5 and 1.0, respectively. Figure 6 shows the effect of a delayed trigger on the average capture ratio of the agent. The simulation was performed on a perimeter with 60% node coverage. The graph is much flatter as compared to the earlier naive results indicating that the percentage of detects that result in captures is largely invariant to sensor delay durations.
Given ample time, the RL-based algorithm always finds paths if they exist, however merely finding a path would not be sufficient, the algorithm needs to identify the path in reasonable time. A good heuristic for reasonable time is the time taken by the oracle algorithm. Figure 7 indicates the success rate of the RL-based algorithm to determine a path at various multiples of the time taken by the oracle algorithm. At higher node coverages, paths may not exist. This is evident by the failure of the oracle algorithm to identify a path at node coverages greater than 80%. The RL-based algorithm fails to identify paths within the same time as the oracle algorithm at all coverages greater than 5% node coverages. Negative reinforcements due to detection and consequently possible captures make the algorithm cautious and prefer to retreat when path confidences are low.
At higher coverages, the RL-based algorithm tends to be increasingly cautious, retreating more often and therefore increasing the amount of time it takes to identify paths. It can be observed that allowing the algorithm take longer to detect paths increases the success rate of the algorithm. Allowing it to execute indefinitely results in the algorithm replicating the behavior of the oracle model.
RELATED WORK
The versatility of reinforcement learning allows it to be applied to a wide variety of problems. Reinforcement learning has been applied in several problems where continuous on-line learning is required. In their study of vulnerabilty assessments of peer to peer networks, Dejmal et.al. develop an attacker model based on reinforcement learning [5] . The learned control policies are used to select the actions of a botnet of one or more malicious nodes. Reinforcement learning techniques have also been used to develop adaptive intrusion detection methods [21] for computer (wired) networks. Complex intrusion behavior is represented as a series of patterns and the learning agent is trained on audit data to identify these patterns.
Deng et al [6] study defenses against an adversary model that targets vulnerable wireless base stations by attempting to locate its physical position using timing or rate correlation attack and packet traffic. Defenses proposed by their work include techniques to introduce redundancy in packet routes, fractal propogation, and using random fake paths to confuse an adversary.
CONCLUSION
Wireless sensor networks are a compelling tool for monitoring physical environments, including in surveillance and security monitoring applications. However, uncertain sensing coverage and the use of wireless signalling open them up to intruders probing to find unmonitored spaces and even detection-free paths through the field. In this paper, we proposed an attacker model based on reinforcement learning that could be applied to understand the effectiveness of defenses against such attacks. Our model is the first step in exploring stronger defenses against such attacks. Ample aspects of modeling the environment and its constraints, as well as studying the effectiveness of alternate learning algorithms, could be explored to further the study of this intrusion model.
